David Stepanyan Biography

Do you have a user name? Register David Stepanyan Political observer of the alternative to the non-alternativeness of the world, despite the unrecognizable reservation of the unrecognized Republic of Artsach and the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, as well as on the interstate border of Armenia-Azerbaijan, acting on the line of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Still remains tense. Accompanied by numerous victims on both sides, periodic shootings continue to be an indispensable attribute of negotiations.

Starting from the year, the largest case of a violation of the ceasefire regime from the 2nd to 5th of the year was the so-called “four-day war”. The result of the Azerbaijan of Azerbaijan was some positions and posts previously occupied by the NKR defense army, as well as several hundred dead and wounded on both sides of military personnel and civilians.

We have to state that the notorious ceasefire is more on paper than are observed by the parties in practice. Moreover, permanent tension and shots on the borders give the opinion about the “frozen” state of conflict even more unconvincing. The result is many years of talk about the upcoming large -scale war. Assessment of the probability of a new war. The rhetoric on such a dimensionality of the resumption of hostilities, at first glance, looks quite high.

And, in general, in the possibility of transforming the conflict from the current state of “neither war nor peace” in a large -scale war, in a large -scale war, in a large -scale war, believe. For Azerbaijan, the Karabakh war ended with a loss of 11.5 thousand square meters. That is why the Nemn layer of Azerbaijan citizens declares the desire for war from revanchist motives.

Militarian sentiments exist both in Armenia and Artsakh, but they do not dominate in a number of causes of societies. The role of the authorities of Azerbaijan in the formation of such moods should be highlighted here. The intentions of “returning the land” were voiced by the highest ranks in Baku almost from the very establishment of the ceasefire. However, with the coming to the authorities of Ilham Aliyev, the statements have become more frequent, their geography has expanded.

The conflict setting the conflict that has been going on from the year under the mandate of the Minsk OSCE group, such claims of the -Azerbaijani negotiators are not voiced. Especially considering that negotiations are based on mutual compromises of “Madrid principles”. However, the level of perception of neighbors-Armenians by ordinary Azerbaijanis, of course, influence. An analysis of opinions sounding in social networks from a neighboring country makes it possible to suggest that targeted cultivation in Azerbaijan of the image of the Armenian enemy is already bearing fruit.

And the revenge, which is declared as the main foreign policy vector significantly increases the risk of transition of the smoldering conflict into a hot phase. Baku continues to give an aggressive offensive policy on the internal and external vector in order to “bring to information” his own willingness to initiate the war at any time. The realities, however, on the path of this policy, are also serious limiters.

External: the defense army of Artsakh, the Armed Forces of Armenia, a possible reaction of the international community and world centers of power. And internal ones: serious problems with the economy, the polyetical nature of the population, rigidly suppressed, but continuing to ripen the dissatisfaction with the permanent rule of Ilham Aliyev. An attempt to protest the same period in Ganja became evidence of the maturation of the dissatisfaction of society by power.

Despite the fact that almost all religious preachers, both Shiites and Sunnis, have long been in prisons, they instantly tried to give the unrest in Gange a religious character. According to the Azerbaijani conflictologist and human rights activist Arif Yunusov3, the Azerbaijani society split into those who do not trust each other and secular. The latter are panickically afraid of believers, which often does not allow them to see the constant attachment of the “Islamic factor” in intra -volume games.

According to the expert, the accident in Minghecaur and unrest in Ganja is the links of one chain leading to Baku. The authority needed an excuse to divert the attention of the population from the consequences of the accident, which was the attempt on the mayor of Ganja, followed by the murder of two colonels of the police. The very fact of such manipulations indicates the presence of smoldering potential in Azerbaijan.

And it seems that it is the outbreak of a large -scale war that is quite capable of becoming a spark for its ignition. It is still fresh, including in the memory of Ilham Aliyev, the march of the rebellious Colonel Suret Huseynov on Baku in the year, which ended with the resignation of Abulfaz Elchibey. Then Heydar Aliyev managed to reassure Huseynov, only appointing him to the Prime Minister.

And in the case of the Second Karabakh war, the military Huseynovsky march may well repeat. Especially given the presence of a wide mass of dissatisfied in the country.Here we go to very interesting things that are relevant for Azerbaijan and until recently for Armenia. In the midst of the “four -day war”, the leader of the “Predparlia” movement, Girair Sephilyan, accused the authorities of Armenia of refusing the universal mobilization of the domestic political reasons4.

After that, the capture of the Yerevan regiment of the PPS in July clearly demonstrated all the weakness of illegitimate power in front of a handful of armed members of the Sasna Crera group. In this light, it seems that the general mobilization of tens of thousands of armed, who hating the power of citizens concludes a threat of the forcibly displacement of this very power.

After the “velvet revolution” in April-May G., meanwhile, as universal mobilization for the leadership of Azerbaijan of death is similar today. A large -scale war without universal mobilization seems nonsense. Another significant obstacle to Azerbaijan's Puturean plans is the population of the population. Lezgins, thala, Taty, Rutulians, Tsahura, Mountains, Avars and Ashkenazi Jews, who are living in Azerbaijan, are by no means eager to fold their heads “for the homeland”, in which, to put it mildly, they are not the best way.

Baku makes significant efforts to underestimate statistical data in order to assimilate national minorities living in the country. The official number of the Dagestan -Lezginsky community of Azerbaijan - the number of Iranian ethnic groups living in the south of Iranian unofficial data reaches half a million people. According to the expert of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Andrei Areshev, the Baku policy on the assimilation of the national minorities of Azerbaijan creates the conditions for domestic political destabilization on national grounds in the future5.

As a result, separatist sentiments are ripening among national minorities, often reaching an example of the idea of ​​creating Talyshstan of the desire for independence. Religious separatism is also ripening in Azerbaijan, to which the authorities also react hard. The most clearly Baku reaction was expressed in November for residents of the village of Nardaran, characterized by special religiosity and opposition to secular power6.

Then, as a result of the operation to prevent a terrorist attack planned by the Muslim Union group, four citizens and two police officers died. The famous Muslim theologian Taleh Bagirzade and his followers were arrested. The Nardaranians are Shiites, Iran’s influence is very noticeable in the village that the Azerbaijan is very disturbed. However, in Baku it is very tightly controlled by the activities of other religious communities, especially those living in the northeastern regions of Sunnis-Salafites.

According to the expert of the Center for the Caucasus Problems and the regional security of MGIMO, the ethnographer Akhmet Labelkapov, the rapid Sunnization of Azerbaijan is already moving into a little controlled phase, which is to a large extent contributes to the policy of limiting Shiism - the influence of Iran7. Thus, the likelihood of Azerbaijan’s independent initiation of full -scale war is small.

By virtue of the totality of the above factors, to try to solve a military, a dosage problem, neglecting the bouquet of modern internal, religious, ethnic, geopolitical and even global challenges, Ilham Aliyev will not be tried. Clearly conditions, a new war for the Azerbaijani clan-oligarchic system will be equivalent to cutting the bitch on which it sits. To predict the possible course and completion of hostilities against the backdrop of the above chaotic-qualifier of the ethno-confessional map of Azerbaijan today, perhaps, perhaps no one.

In this light, the only possible “internal” reason for the war remains when Aliyev will already be on the verge of overthrow, and he will only have an attempt to grab a straw. However, due to a number of reasons, this scenario seems unlikely. Armenia and Artsakh. The rhetoric in the leadership of Armenia to the militarist-rare rhetoric of colleagues from Absheron for many years as a whole is generally used and commented quite sluggishly, as extreme necessity arises.

Oddly enough, in Artsakh, as it may seem, they were generally indifferent to this rhetoric. So it was before the change of power in Armenia as a result of the "velvet revolution." July was marked by a number of rather harsh statements by the Minister of Defense of Armenia David Tonoyan8, his Artsakh colleague Levon Mnatsakanyan9 and, most importantly, the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikola Pashinyan, it seems that such a sharp change in moods in Yerevan and Stepanakert was primarily addressed to world centers and only then - Baku itself.

The Armenian authorities realized the impossibility of any positive deeds in the conditions of their own stay in deaf defense. Hence, there was a need to inform the international community about its own capabilities and the intentions emerging from them. In other words, Symmetric Bakinsky, if you like, the aggressive approach of Yerevan and Stepanakert should now be a surprise to anyone.At the same time, the realities in Armenia and Artsakh a request for a new war with Azerbaijan are not today, as was not before.

In both republics, there are extremely uncompromising citizens guided in the Karabakh settlement of the motto “not a paw of land to the enemy”.

However, even these people do not seek a large -scale war with Azerbaijan. The new Armenian government has no such request. If earlier the Republican Party of Armenia turned appeal to the threat of war into a familiar domestic political cheat, then the new, so far still temporary, the Armenian government simply does not have such a need. In other words, the replacement of illegitimate power with the power supported by society, by definition, removed the relationship of domestic policy and the threat of war emanating from Azerbaijan.

The existing status quo is generally beneficial to the Armenian republics, respectively, there is no reason in the new war. And to endanger such a status quo for the sake of adventurous and gym plans for the “exit to Kuru” or “Nakhijevan’s return” in Yerevan and Stepanakert are clearly not going to. There is another factor that potentially increases the possibility of a large-scale war, and this has reached an unprecedented level of arms race in recent years.

The remaining two countries of the USA and France- weapons do not supply the parties to the conflict. Exceeding Armenian financial capabilities allow Baku to set a direction in this race. As a result, Yerevan carries out return purchases, making a bet not on quantity, but on a certain asymmetry that allows you to level the advantages of the tank, completely based on quantity and quality.

Meanwhile, Armenia until the April war of the year mainly fed its own armed forces by the technique of Soviet production “from warehouses”. An impressive number of heavy ZZOs acquired by Baku indicates a tendency to build up long -range weapons, which leads to the next promotion of the balance of forces. According to the scout, military expert Vladimir Vartanov12, the Azerbaijani command began to pump up the front line with long -range guns after the destruction of two of its sapper groups in the south and north of the contact line in Artsakh in February.

The latter, according to his estimates, became possible as a result of the appearance of the Armenian military elementary systems of night video surveillance. The expert is convinced that as a result of the acquisition by Azerbaijan of long -range artillery and MLRS, the Balance of Forces is necessary and possible to maintain mainly by the preparation of Armenian military personnel for a lightning attack in mountainous conditions.

Such an attack will achieve the level of contact, which allows to deprive the enemy’s artillery, the opportunity to beat the Armenian troops. Recognizing the arms race as a factor that helps to increase the level of escalation of the situation around the conflict, it is impossible to ignore the following important circumstance. Missile systems with a range of tens and hundreds of kilometers are a stick about the two ends and play roller -shaped deterrence weapons.

The Polonaza Armed Forces in service, in service with the Iskanders Armed Forces and even Soviet, but modernized Skyds on Transcaucasian scale play the same role that intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads of the Cold War continue to play. The presence of nuclear power plants in Armenia and oil and oil refineries in Azerbaijan only give this statement additional persuasiveness.

Possible external catalysts Analysis of the possibilities of unfolding a large -scale war around Karabakh, due to geopolitical factors, make it possible to state the absence in the foreseeable perspective in such a scenario of Russia, the USA and the European Union. There is no interest in a crown in general for the same reasons for the IU of Turkey Iran. Both the world and regional centers of power have enough problems at other geopolitical venues.